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1. INTRODUCTION
•
Although the Asian economic and financial crisis affected all key macroeconomic
variables in stricken regional economies, including interest rates, share prices.
national income, employment and inflation rates, it was Asian exchange rates that
fell fastest and furthest. For this reason, the Asian crisis is justifiably referred to as
a currency crisis, first and foremost.
This collapse of Asian exchange rates was all the more surprising at the time.
given that many East Asian exchange rates had hitherto been either fixed or strongly
managed over a lengthy period. The rationale for managing exchange rates the
Asian way was to provide exchange rate certainty for exporters and importers. Yet,
perceived exchange rate stability also meant foreign investors in Asian financial
assets focussed mainly on high relative yields and neglected exchange rate risk.
In 1996, the year before the East Asian crisis began. around SUS 93 billion of
foreign funds had flowed into the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea
and Thailand - the countries subsequently worst hit by the crisis and hereafter
referred to as the 'Asian S'. Upon suddenly realising that exchange risk exposure
was much greater than judged previously, this inflow was completely reversed in
1997. In fact. the previous inflow Was more than completely reversed to the extent
that a SUS 12 billion capital outflow from the region was recorded over the crisis
period as shown in Figure I. The change from net inflow to outflow was a result of
Asian investors themselves remitting funds abroad. This extraordinary international
investment switch by foreign and 'Asian 5' investors was equivalent to around 11
per cent of the combined GDP of the •Asian S' economies.
The reversal of international capital flows that proximately caused the Asian
currency crisis was not, however, the result of adverse investor reaction to poor
macroeconomic fundamentals. Forinstance, 'Asian 5' fiscal balances had been in
surplus, except for a relatively small deficit in Indonesia, inflation rates were not
especially high, ranging between fourto nine percent and, except for the Philippines,
domestic saving rates were high relative to advanced economies.
As is now well known, the 1997-98 re-assessment of Asian economies by
foreign and domestic investors caused ,massive depreciations, especially against
the US dollar, of the Indonesian rupiah, Thai baht. Malaysian ringgit, Philippines
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peso and South Korean won. Forinstance, in US$ terms, the Indonesian rupiah was
worth only 20 per cent of its June 1997 value, while the Thai baht and Korean won
lost around 50 per cent of their former values; the Philippines peso and Malaysian
ringgit fell some 40 per cent below pre-crisis values. The fall in foreign demand for
Asian assets also led to sharp stockmarket falls in the greater East Asian region,
including Hong Kong and Singapore. These asset price collapses put great pressure
on banking and financial systems and ultimately depressed real activity, as
illustrated in Figure 2.
This paper briefly examines the special role that international capital flows
played in the Asian currency crisis. To do this. it examines exchange rate policies
in Asian economies and explains how the sharp reversal of international investment
led to the currency crisis. Finally, the paper canvasses the impact ofthe redirection
ofinternational investment on the Australian economy, concluding with a summary
of the major lessons and opportunities arising from the crisis.
2. EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES IN THE 'ASIAN 5'
Economies are vulnerable to internationaJ capital reversal because of the risks
associated with investing abroad. When investors' perceptions of risk exposure
suddenly change, the immediate withdrawal of funds exerts strong downward
pressure on financiaJ asset values, including bond prices, equities and exchange
rates. The main sources of risk relate to future adverse exchange rate movements
and loan default. In the East Asian case, both default risk and exchange rate risk
were badly underestimated. The main reasons foreign investors underestimated
their risk exposure were a Jack of awareness of structural-weaknesses in the
financial systems, combined with presumptions that Asian monetary authorities
were bearing foreign exchange risk and that the IMP would bear some default risk.
For decades many East Asian economies either adhered to fixed exchange rates
or strictly lintited their flexibility, thus providing Asian borrowers and foreign
lenders alike with a measure of exchange rate certainty underwritten by 'Asian 5'
central banks. Under these conditions, interest differentials drove capital flows and
a large proportion of foreign borrowing was unhedged against the possibility of
large exchange rate depreciations.
When exchange rates in the region came under intense pressure, the monetary
authorities ofthe affected econonties had to choose between defending their exchange
rates via foreign exchange market intervention or by raising short term interest rates
under their control. If domestic interest rates had been raised, for instance to levels
of around 150 per cent as in Russia during ntid-1998, the immediate macroeconontic
impact of the capital outflow would have been borne by the domestic economy
through mass bankruptcy with inevitable contractionary consequences. On the other
hand, letting the exchange rates depreciate would allow international borrowers and
lenders to bear the brunt of the necessary external adjustment.
The monetary authorities in the'Asian 5' quickly surrendered to market forces
after initial attempts to control their exchange rates. This exposed foreign lenders
to the cost of external adjustment which otherwise would have been borne more
directly by Asian businesses and households through higher domestic interest rates.
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3. EXPLAINING HOW THE CURRENCY CRISIS HAPPENED
The Asian 5 currency crisis itself can be modelled with reference to Figure I. This
figure in exchange rate-foreign exchange space reveals why Asian 5 exchange rates
depreciated by so much in response to the switch out of Asian financial assets by
foreigners and by Asian investors themselves. In the figure. the supply of foreign
exchange to Asian markets, Sfx is drawn positively related to Asian exchange rates,
e, collectively defined as Asian currency per unit of foreign currency; a rise in e
therefore denotes Asian currency depreciation. Total foreign exchange supplied to
Asian economies is the sum ofAsian export earnings (Xl, recorded in Asian current
accounts and foreign investment inflows (KI),.recorded in their capital accounts.
The weaker are Asian exchange rates, the more competitiveare theireconomies'
export sectors and hence the greater is the amount of foreign exchange eamed.
Foreign capital inflows to Asian economies on the other hand respond to differentials
between Asian interest rates, jA. interest rates in the rest of the world. i''', and foreign
investors', perceptions of the riskiness of investing in Asian financial markets. RtA •
Hence, the supply of foreign exchange may be represented as
(I)
On the demand side, Asian demand for foreign exchange, Dfx , is made up of
demand for foreign exchange to pay for imports of goods and services and Asian
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investors' demand for foreign exchange to enable purchase of non-Asian assets, KO.
The weaker are Asian exchange rates, the more expensive imports become for
Asian residents and firms and hence the less foreign exchange is required. At the
same time, Asian investors would increase demand for financial assets in the rest
of the world if financial returns abroad were relatively higher, or if they perceived
a rise in the riskiness of holding their own assets, R:. Hence,
. . + +
Df'= M(e) + KO(i', i', R~) (2)
Figure 1 illustrates how Asian exchange rates came under severe pressure as
foreign investors quit Asian financial markets upon realising that risk exposure in
these markets was much higher than previously thought. The S" schedule shifted
upwards to S'" as foreign investment fell from KI to K1'. Asian central banks
initially tried to hold exchange rate steady, but were unwilling to completely
exhaust foreign currency reserves for this purpose, Accordingly, Asian exchange
rates depreciated from eo to et. This exchange rate correction turned into a crisis
however, when Asian investors themselves switched funds out of Asian currency
denominated assets to foreign currency assets. This caused Asian demand for
foreign currencies to increase from Of< to on' which caused substantial further
depreciation, from e, to e, in the figure,
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY
The sudden reversal of short-term capital flows to the East Asian economies has
prompted calls from many quarters to restrict the quantum of foreign borrowing.
This popular line of argument neglects however that the phenomenal growth rates
of most Asian nations over recent years. and even longer in cases such as Hong
Kong and Singapore, have been fuelled by foreign funds. Without that earlier
capital inflow from abroad in its various forms. the crisis economies would now be
on a considerably lower plateau of economic development. Putting this another
way, the economies worst hit by the adjustment are experiencing how difficult it is
to cope when the flow of foreign funds is shut off,
The exchange rate falls, share price slides and sharply reduced growth rates of
East Asian economies have raised concerns about diminished prospects for
Australia's exports of goods and services. Many commentators have presumed that
sharp currency depreciations and faltering Asian economic growth will slow
Australia's exports to the region through two related effects. First, through the so-
called income effect which suggests that a dramatic slowdown of growth in
regional economies will reduce their overall appetite for imports of goods and
services from everywhere. Secondly, through a relative price effect. which means
that exporting to the Asian region becomes that much more difficult because
weaker Asian currencies have made Australian products more expensive from the
Asian buyer's perspective.
Yet, thinking along these lines as a way of gauging the impact of the crisis on
Australia's overall export performance. and hence future domestic economic
growth, can be seriously misleading. This is because such an interpretation
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presumes that other things will remain the same, when in reality they will not
because the world economy is a~ inherently dynamic system.
4.1 Australian Exports and GOP
The Asian financial turmoil occurred because foreign investors adjusted their
portfolios by switching out of Asian financial assets into other more attractive
alternatives. Foreign investment is not likely to return to these countries until
fundamental reforms of financial practices in these economies are firmly in place
and recognised as such by the financial institutions which had provided billions of
dollars worth of funds to the region.
However, the foreign capital that recently quit Asia has been reinvested in. for
instance, Australasia. North America and Western Europe. helping to keep interest
rates low and asset values high in the advanced economies. This has sustained extra
economic activity and created additional trade opportunities in those regions.
Hence, the international capital that has been switched from Asian markets to other
destinations has been instrumental in generating alternative opportunities for
Australian trade, providing apotential offset to any reduction in export opportunities
in Asia.
The post-crisis strength. indeed real growth, in Australia's overall exports and
GDP is readily apparent from Figures 3 and 4. At the same time, the overshooting
of Asian exchange rates and other asset values has created bargain values for
Australian investors and has increased scope for further direct foreign investment
in the region.
4.2 Discipline for Further Reform
The last serious exchange rate crisis for Australia occurred in February 1985. when
the $A depreciated by about 25 per cent in a few weeks. Though on a much smaller
scale than the Asian crisis. that particular currency collapse was also the result of
a significant foreign capital reversal which then signalled the need for fiscal
consolidation and microeconomic reform. At the time. foreign investors exercised
a useful external discipline. ensuring that sustainable economic growth enhancing
policies were adopted in the late 1980s.
The Asian crisis is a reminder that foreign investors may eventually lose
patience waiting for overdue growth-enhancing reforms. Increased commitment to
economic reform in Australia would therefore provide stronger insurance against
another exchange rate collapse in this country and the associated hike in interest
rates that would result. It would also enable Australia to catch-up to the income
levels of those other East Asian economies (namely. Japan, Hong Kong and
Singapore) that have been badly battered by the Asian financial storm and yet still
lead Australia in the national income per head stakes.
5. MAJOR LESSONS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The great East Asian capital flow reversal has taught us that international investors
will respond instantly to new economic information that raises perceived risk levels
or lowers expected relative rates of return. The main reason for the crisis was an
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underestimation of default and exchange rate risk, combined with fragile financial
systems in which both foreign and domestic investors lost confidence. Foreign
investors will continue to favour those economies throughout the world that have
sound financial systems and whose governments have growth-enhancing policies
in place. Accordingly, the best option for minimising future financial crises is to
strengthen the institutional framework, not to prohibit or tax short-term capital
flows.
To sum up. the main lessons and opportunities arising from the Asian crisis are
as follows:
Lessons
• With globally integrated financial markets, foreign investors can now effectively
vote with their funds against economies experiencing unsustainable levels of
economic activity.
• Sharp capital outflows provide the requisite signal that financial practices and
domestic economic policies have to be changed if economies are to recover
quickly.
Opportunities
• The redirection of foreign funds to mainly North American and European
markets has improved Australia's opportunities for further trade with those
regions. which have historically been Australia's major trading partners.
• At the same time, extremely low financial and real asset prices in Asian
economies have improved the scope for increasing portfolio and direct
investment in the financial sectors of the Asian 5 economies and for providing
consultancy services to those countries as they rebuild their financial systems.
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